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Introduction
The EU Institutions between
Enlargement and the Constitution
Dr. Edward Best
Professor, Unit Head – EIPA Maastricht
Much has happened in 2004 to draw attention to the
European institutions, and to make people ask questions
about both their political roles in the evolving European
system and their practical abilities to manage European
business in the future.
On 1 May ten new Member States joined the Union.
How will the Council manage business with 25
delegations around the table? Will a College of 25
Commissioners be able to function efficiently? Will the
Court be able to manage an enlarged workload? Will the
increase in the numbers both of members and of political
parties represented affect the political coherence of the
Parliament? How will all the institutions manage the
near-doubling of the number of official languages from
11 to 20 – with even more to come in the next few years?
In June a new Parliament was elected. These first
elections in the enlarged Union proved to be rather
disappointing. Far from contributing to an increase in
overall electoral participation, the response of most of
the new Member States ensured continuation of the
trend by which average turnout across the Community/
Union has fallen with each successive elections. Yet by
the autumn the talk was more of the Parliament’s ‘coming
of age’, as the President-designate of the new Commission
was forced on 27 October to withdraw his proposed team
in the face of opposition to several candidates. Does this
mark a major change in the roles of the Parliament and
the Commission? Is this the beginning of a new stage in
European public debate?
This situation somewhat clouded the atmosphere in
Rome on 29 October when the 25 governments met to
sign the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
which had finally been agreed in June.  Is this essentially
an ordering exercise aimed at bringing greater consis-
tency, efficiency and transparency into a system which
had become unmanageably – and even undemocrati-
cally – complex? Or, with its proposals for a ‘Minister
for Foreign Affairs’ and ‘European Laws’, does this mark
a qualitative transformation of the Union in the direction
of a more state-like political system?  And, in all events,
what will the changes mean for the practical work of the
institutions and their interaction with European citizens?
Even as the Constitutional Treaty was signed, how-
ever, it did not seem certain that Europe will in fact ever
find out what it means, given the significant possibility
of rejection in at least one of the referendums which are
scheduled to take place in the two-year period which has
been allowed for ratification. Some parts, however, may
come into effect anyway. Indeed, one of the most
important changes proposed – the creation of a common
External Action Service – began to be prepared as soon
as the Treaty was signed, while the European Defence
Agency foreseen in the Constitution was already
established in 2004.
Different Dimensions of Institutional Change
With so much going on, it may be hard to see clearly what
is happening in the broader perspective of the longer-
term development of European integration. What kind
of political system is emerging? What kinds of issue
remain to be addressed if that system and its institutions
are to have the necessary effectiveness and legitimacy
to manage the Union in the face of the ever more
complex realities posed by an ever wider Europe.
It may be helpful to step back briefly and to ‘un-
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bundle’ the situation. The ways in which the European
institutions have changed since the creation of the
Communities can be seen in the light of four concepts
and processes:
• political design,
• institutional reform,
• governance, and
• capacity-building.
These concepts overlap and are not mutually
exclusive. Somewhat different issues and questions are
highlighted, however, in each of these complementary
perspectives on the institutional development of the
Union.
Political  design
The first dimension is one of political negotiation over
different institutional arrangements  inasmuch as these
are seen to embody different preferences as to the political
nature (or ‘finalité politique’) of the ‘European project’.
All Member States agreed at Laeken in 2001 that it
was now appropriate to define a set of basic principles
and rules which could explicitly be presented to citizens
as the ‘Constitution’ of the Union. However, there may
not be a common understanding of the political meaning
of a ‘constitutional’ treaty for Europe. In this sense, the
Convention and the IGC are only the latest episode in
a permanent political debate which unfolds between
two poles, over what formal model of political organi-
zation is desired for Europe – usually in terms of alter-
native forms of unions between states.
At one end, where the fact of a ‘Constitution’ is given
maximum political significance, there are federalist
designs for some kind of ‘United States of Europe’. In its
simplest form, this is a bicameral parliamentary system.
The legislative branch at European level is made up of a
territorially-based Council and a directly-elected
Parliament; the Commission serves as the executive; and
the Court is the independent judiciary.  This is the model
of a ‘European Political Community’ which was briefly
considered in the early 1950s; more or less reiterated in
the European Parliament’s Draft Treaty on European
Union in 1984; and explicitly proposed more recently by,
for example, the Belgian Prime Minister in 2001.
At the other end, there are constitutional designs of
a more confederal nature. The basic elements include a
more limited and instrumental approach to the pooling
of sovereignty, and the attribution of a leading role to
the Council and European Council. This design has
most clearly been expressed in French, starting with
General de Gaulle’s ‘Europe des Patries’, moving through
Jacques Chirac’s ‘Europe unie des États’, and perhaps
best captured in the more recent formula of a ‘Fédération
des États-Nations’. Tony Blair’s formulation in Warsaw
in 2000 – ‘a Europe of free, independent, sovereign
nations who choose to pool that sovereignty in pursuit
of their own interests and the common good’ – in fact
seems to make the same point.
Does the Constitution fundamentally change the
political nature of the institutions?  Article I-6 does, for
the first time, state in primary law the simple federal fact
that ‘The Constitution and law adopted by the institutions
of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it
shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.’
Article I-20 does suggest that Union laws are passed by
two legislative ‘chambers’ and carried out by an
executive accountable to them:
The European Parliament shall, jointly with the
Council, exercise legislative and budgetary
functions. It shall exercise functions of political
control and consultation as laid down in the
Constitution. It shall elect the President of the
Commission.
And the Court of Justice takes on many formal
characteristics of a Constitutional Court of the Union.
Yet things are not quite so simple. When it comes to
decision-making, there are multiple exceptions to the
use of codecision. Member States retain the right of veto
in several key areas.1  Unanimity is still required for
modification of the Constitution. And the vague political
definition given in the very first article seems to
acknowledge the prudence of leaving the Union as an
‘unidentified political object’:
Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe
to build a common future, this Constitution establishes
the European Union, on which the Member States
confer competences to attain objectives they have in
common. The Union shall coordinate the policies by
which the Member States aim to achieve these
objectives, and shall exercise on a Community basis
the competences they confer on it.2
The key question in this perspective is whether there
is a minimum level of political and public consensus
with regard to the political meaning of the institutions
to ensure stability of the integration process. So, will this
formula prove to be sufficient? Or will it unravel as the
ratification process witnesses pressures and campaigns
both from those disappointed by the terms of the
‘constitutional’ settlement, and from those who see it as
going too far in the direction of a genuinely closer
political union.
Institutional reform
‘Institutional Reform’ is the term used in recent decades
to refer to the adaptation of the institutions’ competences,
composition and functioning in response to perceived
‘deficits’, often associated with enlargement. The pos-
sible responses to these problems may be shaped by
ideological preferences regarding political design, but
the starting point is generally the existence of functional
challenges.
These partly relate to the efficiency of decision-
making, the ‘ease’ with which binding decisions can be
reached. Problems in this respect are seen to be exacer-
bated as successive enlargements increase the number
and diversity of Member States, while new areas in
which the Union pursues common goals are charac-
terized by ever greater complexity and sensitivity.
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Integrationists tend to urge a greater pooling of sove-
reignty through majority voting and/or the delegation
of powers to autonomous institutions. More ‘Euro-
hesitant’ actors tend to question whether, if there are
such deep differences, it is in fact appropriate to make
the adoption of generally-binding decisions easier,
even against national preferences; at most one should
seek other forms of cooperation which are not so binding
or uniform in their impact.
Efficiency concerns are evidently not the same as –
and can even enter into tension with – concerns over
institutional legitimacy, meaning a general acceptance
of the basic ‘rightfulness’ of the authorities which
generate norms, on the part of those who are bound by
them. Quite different specific elements may be involved
when it comes to the European institutions. And here
again, ideological preferences naturally shape how the
problems and their possible solutions are perceived. In
the perspective of  ‘institutional reform’, as opposed to
‘governance’, there are two key concepts.
The first is 'fairness' in relation to the representation
and relative power of participating countries in the
common institutions. Citizens will be less inclined to
accept rules adopted by bodies in which they feel that
they or their governments (or any other form of recognized
representative association) are not represented according
to principles which are seen to be appropriate and just.
This point has been sharpest and most painful with
regard to the weighting of votes in the Council. The
system which applied in EU 15 came, among other
things, to be seen as ‘unfair’ by Germany and The
Netherlands, whose much greater demographic weight
vis-à-vis France and Belgium respectively was not
reflected in the parity of Council votes. The voting
arrangements reached at Nice were not seen as fully ‘fair’
either, Spain and Poland having 27 votes compared to
Germany’s 29 despite having only half the population.
Hence, the renewed arguments in the following
Intergovernmental Conference which held up final
agreement of the Constitutional Treaty until June 2004.
To a lesser extent it has been an issue for the Parliament.
There was a whiff of discrimination at Nice against ‘new’
Member States, two of which were not initially allocated
the same number of seats as ‘old’ Member States with
almost identical populations (and one still has not), thus
visibly violating the basic principle of equal repre-
sentation of citizens at each level of population size.3
A second is ‘accountability’, usually understood as
the need for the European institutions, which adopt
binding rules and spend public money, to be answerable
to citizens through elected bodies. If a decision is taken
at European level, especially if majority voting is
involved, then there has to be an elected European body
capable of directly channelling citizens’ concerns and
exercising political control on their behalf. This has
been the main functional logic behind the successive
increases in the powers of the European Parliament – the
traditional approach to dealing with the ‘democratic
deficit’. It is interesting, however, that Article I-46 of the
Constitution explicitly mentions not only the direct
election of Parliament, but also the democratic
accountability of the governments meeting in the
Council to their citizens and national parliaments.
Moreover, national parliaments are given other roles in
the Constitution, notably with regard to controlling
respect for the principles of subsidiarity.
Both the efficiency and the legitimacy concerns of
‘institutional reform’ refer predominantly to official
structures and relationships. On the one hand, the key
question is whether the institutions can adapt their
internal structures and working methods, in the context
of enlargement, to produce the results needed to make
Union action possible, whether this means Commission
proposals, Council decisions, Parliament positions or
Court judgements. On the other, the issue is whether
formal criteria of legitimacy are seen to be satisfied. Do
the European Parliament and the national parliaments
(and, within the national systems, regional authorities)
consider that they are given sufficient institutional
powers to give input and scrutinize output? What is
often missing from such pictures, however, is the rela-
tionship between the institutions and citizens, and the
whole question of the participation of actors of civil
society.
Governance
A third dimension, indeed, which is associated with the
concept of ‘governance’, reflects precisely the under-
standing that the functioning (and the quality) of a
system cannot only be seen in terms of the formal
structures of authority but also needs to take into account
the interaction between these and the actors of civil
society. The issues at stake here do not concern the kind
of formal political model which is created, and they go
beyond the question of efficiency and formal accoun-
tability. They relate to the democratic quality of the
whole system of actors and relationships involved.
In the EU context, the term has a more specific
connotation, namely the discussions which started in
and around parts of the European Commission in the
mid-1990s, based, among other things, on the belief that
institutional reform was not going to be sufficient to
overcome the lack of public support which was so
evident in the wake of the Maastricht ratification
problems. Indeed, this point is still clearly made at the
start of the resulting White Paper on Governance in 2001
when it states that, despite the successes of European
integration and its formal democratic basis – the ‘double
democratic mandate’ of directly-elected European
Parliament and Council representing the elected
governments of the Member States – ‘many Europeans
feel alienated from the Union’s work.’4   The evolution
of the institutions therefore needs to be seen in the
broader perspective of ‘principles of good governance’,
identified in the White Paper as openness, participation,
accountability, effectiveness and coherence.
More provocatively, the October 2000 Work
Programme for the White Paper even suggested
(somewhat to the annoyance of the European Parliament)
that participation in fact constitutes a second source of
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legitimacy for the Union:
‘democracy in Europe is based on two twin pillars
– the accountability of executives to European and
national legislative bodies and the effective
involvement of citizens in devising and implementing
decisions that affect them’.5
Interestingly, the Constitution seems to echo this to
some extent. The chapter on ‘The Democratic Life of the
Union’ is not limited to the article on representative
democracy. This is followed first by an article dedicated
to ‘The principle of participatory democracy’. This
makes explicit reference to the importance of the
Commission’s consultations with ‘parties concerned’
and of dialogue between all institutions with ‘repre-
sentative associations and civil society’, as well as
introducing the possibility for one million citizens to
ask the Commission to submit a legislative proposal.
The chapter then includes an article on ‘The social
partners and autonomous social dialogue’.
From a ‘governance’ perspective on institutional
development, then, key questions concern the rela-
tionship between the European institutions and
European citizens and social actors. In addition to
accountability, direct or indirect, the main issues include
the ways in which citizens and social actors may come
to participate actively in the integration process and to
support the institutions as actors within the multi-level
European system.
Capacity-Building
A fourth dimension of change concerns the resources
and internal management of the institutions, and their
consequent ability to handle the growing demands
which are placed upon them in practical terms.
This is not only a question of decision-making
procedures in any of the institutions, but of their general
capacity to manage European business efficiently. These
challenges are not new or only due to enlargement.
However, the successive expansions of Union member-
ship inevitably exacerbate the problems. The unprece-
dented scale of the 2004 enlargement means that this
dimension is all the more  important this time.
It should also be added that these challenges do not
apply only to the European institutions. In the EU
system, implementation of policies depends fundamen-
tally on the Member States, and the record in recent years
among ‘old’ Member States has been far from satisfactory.
The new Member States have been subject to a high
degree of pressure – and have received a great deal of
support – to ensure that they will be able to implement
Community rules. However, the European institutions,
particularly the Commission, have a fundamental role
to play. In this sense, the ‘capacity’ challenge is double
– to ensure adequate resources and management capacity
within the institution itself, and also to oversee and
support implementation capacities within the Member
States.
The European Institutions in 2004
This special issue of Eipascope looks at the European
institutions in 2004, ‘between enlargement and the
Constitution’. That is, in the light of the analytical
perspectives outlined above, the contributions ask
whether the preparations for enlargement have been
sufficient and what the impact of enlargement may now
prove to be, as well as looking at what the newly-signed
Constitution may mean for their practical work and
political role.
The Council
Most public attention in the last few years concerning
the Council has concentrated on two sensitive issues of
institutional reform.
The first is qualified-majority voting (QMV). On the
one hand, the debate has concerned the scope of
application. In an ever bigger Union, how far can Member
States expect to retain the right of veto if the EU is to
avoid paralysis in key areas for the future? On the other,
how should one revise the system for determining a
qualified majority so as to ensure efficiency, fairness
and comprehensibility? The Nice Summit agreed on a
new system, which came into force on 1 November 2004.
This provides for a re-weighting of votes (ranging from
29 for each of the largest four countries down to three for
Malta) and three criteria for adoption of decisions. A
qualified majority needs at least 232 votes out of the
total of 321. The votes must be cast by a numerical
majority of Member States. And any Member State may
request verification that a winning coalition of votes
represents at least 62% of the EU population.
The European Convention proposed replacing these
arrangements by a system of dual majority. Weighted
votes would disappear. A qualified majority would
require a simple majority of states representing 60% of
the population. The Constitution in the end has adopted
a somewhat modified system of dual majority. The basic
principle is that a qualified majority requires 55% of the
Member States and 65% of the total population, with the
additional condition that a blocking minority must
consist of at least four Member States. Yet further
conditions are to apply until at least 2014.
The second has been the Presidency of the Council.
The traditional system of six-monthly rotation has been
defended by some as a symbol of the equality of states,
criticized by others as a source of discontinuity. At the
same time, there has been discussion of the adequacy of
the ‘troika’ arrangements for external representation of
the Union which have existed since the entry into force
of the Amsterdam Treaty. In the end, the Constitution
provides for three different arrangements. There is to be
a President of the European Council, elected for two and
one-half years, renewable once. External relations will
come under a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, who
will be nominated for five years, and chair a Foreign
Affairs Council as well as serve as Vice-President for
External Relations in the Commission. The remaining
presidency functions will continue to be carried out by
6 Eipascope 2004/3 http://www.eipa.nl
a rotating six-monthly presidency, within a sequence
based on pre-determined groups of three countries.
These groups may establish special forms of coordination
between themselves.
Important as both these issues are, however, the
Council’s main concern in the immediate future is how
to manage the practical problems which enlargement
has brought to a head, in terms of structures, resources
and working methods.
The article by Nicole Bayer in this issue thus focuses
on these fundamental but less widely-discussed
dimensions of Council business, and offers a preliminary
assessment of the adequacy of the solutions which have
been proposed so far.
The European Parliament
The European Parliament is the institution which seems,
at least in formal terms, to have been most strengthened
by developments in 2004. The Constitutional Treaty
continues the trend by which the Parliament has received
stronger powers in every successive reform. The Parlia-
ment’s role in decision-making is again strengthened,
with codecision to become the norm for legislative acts.
‘European laws and framework laws shall be
adopted, on the basis of proposals from the Com-
mission, jointly by the European Parliament and the
Council under the ordinary legislative procedure…
If the two institutions cannot reach agreement on an
act, it shall not be adopted.’6
The Constitution also provides for a change in the
way in which the Commission's accountability to
Parliament is conceptualized. The Treaty currently
provides for the Parliament to give its approval first to
the person who is nominated by the Council, and
subsequently to the Commission ‘as a body’. In the
European Convention, there was much discussion about
proposals to link the Commission – or at least its
President, who gives that institution ‘political guidance’
– more explicitly to the majority in Parliament. Some
argued that the President should be elected from among
candidates proposed by the Political Groups either by
Parliament itself, or perhaps by Europe-wide election.
The Constitution finally included the following
compromise:
‘Taking into account the elections to the European
Parliament and after having held the appropriate
consultations, the European Council, acting by a
qualified majority, shall propose to the European
Parliament a candidate for President of the
Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the
European Parliament by a majority of its component
members.’7
The Parliament’s growing powers – as well as an
apparent increase in the party-political dimensions of
the debates – were dramatically demonstrated at the end
of October when, in the face of opposition within the
Parliament to several nominees, the President-designate
of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, was led to ask
for a postponement of the Parliament’s scheduled vote
of approval and consequently to modify his proposed
College of Commissioners.
In this context, the question naturally arises as to the
possible impacts of enlargement on the European
Parliament at this time of mounting political respon-
sibilities. The article by Edward Best and Francis
Jacobs in this issue thus discusses three aspects of this
question:  the possible impact on Parliament’s efficiency,
in terms of its internal structures and working methods;
on its coherence, in the sense of its Groups’ ability,
together with European political parties, to be seen to
present clear policy choices at European level; and on
its legitimacy, in terms of its public support.
The European Commission
The European Commission, for its part, faces enormous
responsibilities in the enlarged Union, for which it
needs sufficient resources, support and credibility.
Debates have tended to focus on the size and
composition of the Commission. Should every Member
State be entitled to have a national in the College of
Commissioners? One side has argued that there should
be fewer Commissioners than there are Member States.
This, it is argued, would make the Commission more
efficient as well as more ‘independent’, and on both
grounds make it better able to fulfil its European mission.
The other side responds that the problems of efficiency
are exaggerated, since it is not so difficult to organize 25
or 30 people; that independence need not be compro-
mised by the presence of nationals from all Member
States, while that presence can help ensure that the
Commission is felt to fulfil its mission of guaranteeing
balanced attention to the interests of all parties, big or
small; and that legitimacy is better served for everyone
by maintaining a national link. The Constitution
proposes a compromise. The first Commission to be
appointed after entry into force of the Constitution will
consist of one Commissioner per Member State. The
next Commission – supposedly that taking office in
2014 – will have only two-thirds the number of Member
States. It remains to be seen whether this intention will
eventually be carried out.
Public attention has also concentrated on the
efficiency and the sound financial management of the
Commission. The Commission has indeed been engaged
in a process of internal reform since the 1990s, much
sharpened by the fall of the Santer Commission and the
subsequent initiatives taken by the Prodi Commission.
Thomas Christiansen and Mark Gray therefore
discuss the background to these reforms and evaluate
the results achieved by 2004. They consider some of the
main practical implications posed by enlargement for
the Commission. They also look at the institution’s
position in the evolving political system, and the tensions
created by the Commission’s increasing reliance on the
European Parliament, on the one hand, and the impor-
tance of its maintaining strong links with national
governments, on the other. They conclude by looking
at the challenges facing the Barroso Commission.
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La Cour de justice européenne
In preparation for enlargement, the Treaty of Nice
introduced a number of changes concerning the internal
organisation of the Court of Justice, as well as the
distribution of competences between the Court of Justice
and the Court of First Instance.
The Constitutional Treaty foresees even broader
changes in the structure of the Court, and gives it some
formal characteristics of a Constitutional Court of the
Union.
The article by Véronique Bertoli-Chappelart and
Stéphane Arnaud asks whether the changes proposed at
Nice will be sufficient to deal with the challenges of
enlargement for Court business, and looks at some of the
remaining questions which have to be answered with
regard to the real meaning of its new ‘constitutional’
roles.
The Institutional Dimensions of External Action
One of the most prominent issues underlying the ongoing
institutional debates has been the feeling that European
Union has failed to live up to its potential as an
international actor – and that it has indeed notably
failed on many occasions even to act as a single actor.
It is a continuing hope that institutional changes can
help not only to talk with a single voice but to bring
about a real convergence of interests. The proposals of
the Constitutional Treaty are important in this respect.
The Union is to have legal personality, thus ending (at
least formally) the division between Community
competences and intergovernmental pillars. A Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs will replace the current
‘troika’ for external representation of the Union, made
up of the country holding the rotating Presidency of the
Council (perhaps accompanied by the incoming
Presidency), the High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security and Policy, and the External
Relations Commissioner. As noted above, the proposals
for a common External Action Service are not only one
of the most potentially significant changes included in
the Constitution but are already beginning to be set in
motion. The design of this service will have major
implications for the Council and the Commission. There
are also important political concerns, notably with
regard to the role of the European Parliament.  The final
article, by Simon Duke, therefore looks at the evolving
role of the institutions with regard to external relations.
_________
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